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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
The issue presented by this appeal is whether failure to
make a single objection, when viewed in light of the entire
record, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 4, 1985, the Defendant entered the ZCMI store at the
Valley Fair Mall in West Valley City.

He was seen by Katherine

Loveless, secretary to the personnel manager.

She described his

attire as jogging shorts, athletic-type shirt, and a utility belt
around his waist.

When asked if she noticed anything peculiar

about him, she said his jogging shorts were hiked up and that he
was exposed.

When asked to explain "exposed" she stated, "His

private parts were showing for all the world to see."
11 21-22.)

(TT p.36

This was apparently the case, as she later described

young women in the credit line giggling and older ladies making
an audible intake of break (breath).

(TT p.42, 11 16-19.)

Ms. Loveless was shown a picture of the Defendant which he
said depicted his attire on May 4, 1985.
taken by Lyn Horton.

This photograph was

(TT p.117, 11 9-16.)

According to the

Defendant, he had to deliberately arrange his clothing in order
to make the bulge in his undershorts visible below the jogging
shorts he wore in the photograph.

(TT p.94, 11 1-12.) When Ms.

Loveless compared what she saw in the photograph with what she
saw on May 4, she stated the shorts were hiked up a lot more than
1

they were in the photograph.

(TT p.38, 11 22-24.)

This was

before the Defendant came out of the men's room, when his shorts
were hiked up even higher. (TT p.41 11 15-22.)
Following Ms. Loveless1 testimony, the City called Stewart
Poore.

Mr. Poore testitifed he saw an astonished look on Ms.

Loveless' face and that she told him a man had just walked by
while partially exposed.

(TT p.52, 11 3-10.)

Mr. Poore also

noticed the Defendant was exposed (Id., at 11 17-10.)

Mr. Poore

stated the Defendant's shorts were hiked up much higher than
depicted in the photograph (TT p.53, 11 14-18), and noted the
reaction of persons near the credit office (TT p.55, 11 13-16).
The City next called Scott Longson.
Defendant

was exposed.

He also testified the

(TT p.76 11 3-8.)

testimony, the City called Ann Zupon.

Following his

She stated what called her

attention to the Defendant was the fact he was exposing himself.
(TT p.73, 11 22-23.)

She also testitifed people in the credit

line saw him (TT p.74, 11 10), and that the problem was worse
when he existed the men's room.

(Id., at 11 14-18).

The City

called no further witnesses and rested.
As its first witness, the defense called the Defendant,
Kenneth Rislow.

He stated he did not know any of his private

parts were exposed to public view.

(TT p. 89, 11 12-16.)

On cross-examination, the Defendant stated the undershorts
he was wearing had elastic around the leg which was very tight.
(TT p.91, 11 16-18.)

He stated that when a police officer

approached him, he was not hanging out and did not have to adjust

2

himself.

(TT p.91, 11 19-25; p. 92,

11 1-2.)

It was his

contention that he was never exposed, but people must have
mistaken the shorts for his private parts.
Following

(TT p.92, 11 3-9.)

the Defendant's testimony,

several

character

witnesses testified as to their opinion of his moral character
and the Defendant's reputation for truthfulness and honesty.
City called the Defendant's ex-wife in rebuttal.

The

She testified

that the Defendant had lied to her constantly (TT p. 121, 11 212), and that he had registered a vehicle in New Jersey rather
than pay Utah State taxes on it.

(TT p.122, 11 7-12.)

She also

testified that he did not have a good reputation for telling the
truth.

(TT p.124, 11 6-9.)

The City also recalled Ms. Loveless as a rebuttal witness.
She was shown the undershorts the Defendant said he was wearing
and asked if it were possible it was the shorts she had seen.
She replied, "No way."

(TT p.132, 11 2-5.)

At the conclusion of rebuttal testimony and the reading of
the instructions, the case was submitted to the jury.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The issue in this case is whether failure to object to an
improper

statement

made by the Prosecutor

during

rebuttal

constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
The City submits that the lack of an objection was a
tactical decision and that evidence of guilt was such that making
the objection or the absence of the Prosecutor's statement would

3

not have made the outcome different.

Therefore, it cannot be

said Appellant's trial counsel was ineffective.

ARGUMENT
VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ENTIRE RECORD, THE
LACK OF AN OBJECTION TO THE PROSECUTOR'S REBUTTAL
ARGUMENT WAS A TACTICAL DECISION, AND THE VERDICT
WAS NOT EFFECTED BY THE ARGUMENT
Defendant bases his ineffective assistance argument on the
lack of a single objection.

This Court, in Codianna v Morris,

660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983), reaffirmed the test used to determine
whether or not counsel has been ineffective.

Two elements were

identified, a subjective element and an objective element.

The

subjective element, willingness to identify with the interest of
the accused, and the objective element, competency, are both
necessary.

Three factors are used to make the determination

regarding the objective element.

First, the Defendant must prove

to the level of demonstrable reality that the representation is
inadequate.

Second, a legitimate exercise in judgment regarding

strategy or tactics does not constitute ineffective assistance.
Third, any deficiency must be prejudicial.

That is, but for the

error it must be reasonably likely there would have been a
different result.

Codianna, supra at 1109.

The Defendant argues that he has met the first portion of
the test because trial counsel did not object to the Prosecutor's
statement during rebuttal•

It is true that statement invited the

jurors to consider matters they would not be justified in
considering.

An objection to the statement would have been

4

sustained.

But, while the presence of the statement and the lack

of an objection is a demonstrable reality, that is not sufficient
to meet the test.

As this Court stated in Codianna, "Counsel

need not recognize and raise every possible objection in order to
meet the compentence standard."

Id. at 1113.

It is the record

as a whole which must be reviewed and establish the "demonstrable
reality."

State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 403 (Utah 1986) at 402-

403.
The Defendant also argues the decision not to object could
not have been a tactical decision.

This is not the case.

Trial

counsel had observed the jury's reaction throughout the day.

He

was in the best position to assess the impact of the remark in
context of the entire trial.

As the district court noted in its

first memorandum decision, "In view of the several objections of
defense counsel

(many of which were over-ruled) before the

remarks of the prosecutor in closing argument, defense counsel
may reasonably have determined that it was in his client's best
interest not to object. (Tr., pp 120, 121, 122, 123, 127, 128,
129, 130, 131).
would

have

Defense counsel may have felt that the jury

reacted

adversely

to the

objection was made and overruled.

appellant

if another

Furthermore, the failure to

object may have been based upon defense counsel's reasonable hope
that the jury would not

focus on the remarks, and upon a

reasonable belief that an objection would only focus their
attention on matters which they should not consider.

It appears,

therefore, that defense counsel's decision not to object to the
5

Prosecutor's remarks was a legitimate exercise of professional
judgment, and it is speculative whether or not such decision
constituted an inadequate assistance by counsel•"

Memorandum

decision of Judge Judith Billings, attached as Appendix "A".
The City submits it is proper to defer to the trial attorney
(State v, Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984) at 1204.

A copy of

P.1204 is attached as Appendix "B". The City respectfully refers
the Court to footnote 19. ), who had identified himself with the
interests of his client, made numerous objections, actively
cross-examined witnesses, called several witnesses on his clients
behalf, and fully participated in the trial consistent with the
ethics of the profession.

The second prong has not been met. .

The third prong of the test is whether or not a deficiency
was prejudicial.

The Codianna Court defined prejudice as an

error without which there would be a reasonable likelihood the
result would have been different.

This is similar to the test

which was set forth in State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d
422 (1973).
The first part of the Valdez test is met in the case at bar.
The prosecutor's remark did suggest something other than the
Defendant's guilt was before the jury.

The second part of the

test, that the jurors were probably influenced, cannot be met.
In State v» Andreason, supra this Court applied the test set
forth in Valdez.

In Andreason, this Court held because of the

marginal nature of the evidence on intent, there was a reasonable
likelihood the remark affected the jury. Andreason, supra at 403.
6

The instant case is distinguishable from Andreason.
The evidence in Andreason was clearly circumstantial.
one was ever seen bypassing the electrial meters.
seen using tools in the new warehouse.

No

No one was

No tests were ever made

to determine if the outlets in the warehouse were receiving live
voltage through the meter.

Witnesses testified power was brought

in by extension cord from outside sources.

Outside lighting at

another building was obtained through bypassing the meter, but no
direct evidence was introduced on who had done that.

A formula

was used to compute the amount of power used without any direct
evidence of use of the tools.

Andreason, supra at 401.

Court concluded there was no direct evidence of guilt.

This
Id. at

403.
The evidence of guilt in the instant case is much stronger.
There can be no question that the Defendant was exposed.
evidence on that point was overwhelming.
by four store employees.

The

His genitals were seen

Two of them testified people in the

credit area also saw his genitals.
The instant case is similar to Andreason in that in both the
evidence on intent is circumstantial.
circumstantial.

Proof of intent usually is

State v. Smith, 46 UAR 20 (1986) at 21.

But

unlike Andreason, the evidence in the case at bar is trong.

The

Defendant's own testimony clearly implies his intent.
The Defendant identified a photograph of himself which he
said depicted his appearance and dress the day he was arrested.
He contended what the people in the store saw was his

7

undershorts.

His testimony regarding

the photograph bears

directly on his intent•
"A

What are you asking, sir?

Q

That he saw the red shorts and though that that

was you?
A

He saw the brownish-red shorts, sir—

Q

Brownish-red shorts.

A

—and thought that—and the very tight brownish-

red shorts and thought that was me.
Q

And in fact, sir, when you were—when you had this

picture

taken

in Portland

Plaintiff's Exhibit

that

we've marked

as

1, you were wearing those red

shorts, weren't you?
A

That correct.

Q

And in fact, they're partially visible there,

arent' they?
A

That's correct.

Q

And--

A

Deliberately, sir.

Q

Deliberately?

A

That's correct.

Q

In other words, you had to make an effort to get

your shorts out around so that part of you would hang
out of there; isn't that correct?
A

It's correct, sir, that I was illustrating the

point that they were visible from the shorts, that the

8

shorts were moved."
The

Defendant's

(TT p.93 11 14-25; p. 94, ii 1-12.
own

testitmony

was

that

he

had

to

deliberately pull his jogging shorts up so the undershorts could
be seen in the photograph.

Both Ms. Loveless and Mr. Poore

testified that the jogging shorts were hiked up much higher on
May 4, 1985, than they were in the photograph.
24; p. 53, 11 14-18).

(TT p.38, 11 22-

Both Ms. Loveless and Ms. Zupon testitied

that the jogging shorts were even higher when the Defendant
exited the men's room.

(TT p.41, 11 15-22; p. 74, 11 1-10).

Even if it had been undershorts that everyone saw, there is only
one logical conclusion to come to regarding how the jogging
shorts came to be hiked up as high they were:

The Defendant

deliberately pulled them up.
The Defendant's contention it was not his genitalia which
were exposed

is simply not credible.

In contrast

to the

testimony that he was exposed, the Defendant testified he did not
know he was exposed.

(TT p.89, 11 12-16).

He also stated that

the undershorts he claimed to have worn were very tight. (TT
p.91, 11 16-18' p. 92 1 9).

Surely the Defendant would have

known if his private parts were outside of those tight shorts.
Ms. Loveless testified there was "no-way" it was the shorts she
had seen. (TT p. 132, 11 2-5).

The jury properly concluded that

he was exposed and that he deliberately exposed himself.
Defendant

also argues negative character

evidence was

improperly introduced by the City during rebuttal.

The City

submits the evidence that the Defendant lied to his former wife
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and registered a vehicle in New Jersey to avoid paying Utah
Taxes.

(TT p.121,

11 2-12; p. 122, 11 7-12) was properly

received.
In State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 350 (Utah 1985) this Court held
the introduction of specific instances of conduct as part of
Defendant's case in chief was prohibited by the Utah Rules of
Evidence.

Whether or not specific instances of conduct would be

proper as rebuttal evidence was not addressed in Miller.
to the present

Prior

rules taking effect, this Court ruled that

specific instances of conduct were appropriate rebuttal evidence.
State v. Green, 578 P. 2d 512 (Utah 1978) at 514.

The City

submits that under the present rules, (Rule 404 and 405) there
are instances where specific instances of conduct are proper
rebuttal.
In United States v. Johnson, 634 F.2d 735 (1980), (attached
as Appendix "E") the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
Rule 404(b) made extrinsic acts evidence inadmissible solely to
prove the Defendant is a bad character likely to commit the crime
charged.

They also stated such acts were admissible for other

purposes, such as those set forth by the rule, but that the list
was illustrative, not exclusive.

Id., at 737.

The Johnson Court dealt with facts somewhat like those in
the case at bar.

Johnson's defense in her income tax evasion

trial was inadvertance.
several

She testified to that end and brought in

local witnesses who testified

to her truthfulness,

honesty and compassion, as well as the busy nature of her medical
10

practice.

Id., at 736

To rebut this evidence, the government called an auditor who
testified at length about his investigation of her books.

He

stated her books showed Johnson reported four times as many
services per patient as other Virginia doctors, and that she had
billed for services she had not performed.
held this testimony was admissible.

The Johnson Court

Id., at 736, 737.

After commenting on the discretion granted a trial judge
under Rule 404(b), the Court noted,
"Particularly where, as here, a defendant in
a criminal case by her own testimony and that
of others has deliberately sought as the
primary means of defense to depict herself as
one who essential philosophy and habitual
conduct in life is completely at odds with
the possession of a state of mind requisite
to guilt of the offense charged, that
defendant may have been considered in effect
to have forfeited any protection that the
first sentence of the Rule might otherwise
have provided against the type of "other act"
evidence here challenged."
Johnson, supra at 737, 738
The City submits the Defendant's evidence raised two issues:
1) his moral character, that is, that his philosophy and habitual
conduct

were

at

odds with

credibility as a witness.

exposing

himself;

and

2) his

The City suggest that by so doing, he

placed himself outside the protection afforded him in Rule 404.
The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled on this issue.
In United States v. Gustafson, 728 F.2d 1078 (1984), (attached as
Appendix "D") they addressed the question of admission of other
wrongs or acts.

They stated that Rule 404(b) is one of inclusion
11

allowing admission of other crimes, wrongs or acts relevant to an
issue in the trial.

They stated that the trial court has broad

discretion in deciding whether or not to admit such evidence and
would only be reversed when it is clear such evidence has no
bearing on any of the issues involved in the trial.
1083).

(Id., at

A review of the record makes it clear the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence haring on the
issues raised by the Defendant.
The Defendant placed his moral character and his character
for truthfulness and veracity in issue by testifying and calling
character witnesses.

When the prosecutor asked Mrs. Richards,

the Defendant's ex-wife, if he had lied to her, defense counsel
objected.

The court overruled the objection, stating, "I think

in light of the character evidence that's been received, that
this is proper rebuttal."

(TT p. 121, 11 7-8.)

Mrs. Richards

stated that he had lied on numerous occasions, that he had
registered a vehicle in New Jersey to avoid paying Utah State
taxes on it, and that he had a poor reputation for truthfulness
and veracity.
allowed

(TT pp. 121-124.)

rebuttal

evidence

instances of conduct.

The trial Court properly

consisting

of relevant

specific

The City submits under the standards of

Green, Johnson and Gustafson, supra, there was no abuse of
discretion.
When the entire record and the circumstances of the case are
considered, it is clear the remarks of the prosecutor did not
effect the verdict.

Evidence that the Defendant was exposed was
12

overwhelming.

The evidence also showed there was only one way

the Defendant's shorts could have been high enough to facilitate
the exposure:

he did it deliberately.

Even though an improper

argument was made, and assuming improper rebuttal testimony was
admitted, the evidence was such that it is not reasonably likely
the result would have been different.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the City submits that trial counsel
was effective and competent and respectfully moves this Court to
affirm the conviction and remand the case to the circuit court.
DATED this

day of December, 1986.

R. SPENCER ROBINSON
Assistant City Prosecutor
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APPENDIX "A
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WEST VALLEY CITY,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NO.

CRA-86-9

:

KENNETH H. RISLOW,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

This is an appeal from the Fifth Circuit Court, West Valley
Department from a conviction, by jury, with the Honorable Tyrone
E. Medley presiding, for the offense of lewdness, a Class B
Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 13-9-702 of the West Valley
Revised Ordinances.
and a new trial.

Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction
This Court, having reviewed the record and

the Memoranda submitted by counsel for both parties, enters
its Memorandum Decision in this case, as follows.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The appellant was charged in West Valley City with the
offense of lewdness, a Class B Misdemeanor. The incident occurred
at the ZCMI department store located at the Valley Fair Mall
in West Valley City.

West Valley City claimed that the defendant

entered the store wearing jogging shorts, hiked up considerably
to one side, and that appellantfs genitalia were fully and obviously
exposed to all present.

The City alleged that the appellant
14
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PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

entered the store, stood for a few moments in a line at the
credit department, then walked through the toy department, returned
to the credit department area, leaned up against a bus schedule
stand for a few moments, and then went into the restroom.

Upon

leaving the restroom, there was testimony that the appellant1 s
exposure was worse than it had been prior to entering the restroom.
Appellant, on the other hand, claims that the exposure did not
occur at all, that he was wearing tight-fitting undershorts
under his jogging shorts, and that the witnesses testifying
as to his exposure must have been mistaken as to what they saw.
At the trial of this matter, the appellant called three
character witnesses to testify as to his general good character
and truthfulness. In rebuttal, the prosecutor called the appellantf s
ex-wife. During the course of the direct examination of appellant's
ex-wife, the prosecutor asked questions regarding specific instances
of the appellant's conduct bearing on his character and truthfulness.

Over the objection of appellantfs counsel, the trial

court allowed appellant1s ex-wife to testify that appellant
had lied to her on several occasions, that on one specific occasion
the defendant had registered an automobile in New Jersey in
order to avoid the Utah State taxes, and that he was somewhat
recalcitrant regarding the payment of income taxes during their
marriage. (Tr. , pp 121-22) •

Further testimony of appellantfs

ex-wife to the effect that he had physically hurt her, and that

15
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

people were afraid of him was stricken, and the jury was instructed
to disregard such testimony.

(Tr., pp 122-24). Appellant contends

that the court erred in allowing testimony of specific instances
bearing on the appellant's character•

Respondents, however,

argue that such evidence was proper where the appellant's character
was brought into issue by the appellant calling character witnesses
in his own behalf.
Appellant further contends that the court also erred in
allowing the following remarks by the prosecutor in his closing
argument:
Counsel finally says that hefs [appellant]
guilty of being a slop, not lewdness. Ifm
sorry, it's more than that. It's much more
than that. Do you want people walking into
the stores where you shop, dressed in that
fashion, dangling their genitalia and you're
going to find them not guilty? See, that
presumption of innocence just went out the
window. It's now time for you to decide
this case. If you want these people walking
around in your stores where you shop, then
you're going to find him not guilty. If
you want to put a stop to it, you're going
to find him guilty. You raised your hand,
an obligation, you swore that you would
well and truly try this case. I am asking
you to do what you agreed to do.
(Tr.,
P 173).
In addition to claiming error in allowing these remarks, appellant
contends that the failure of defense counsel at trial to object
to the prosecutor's statements amounted to a denial of appellant's
right to effective assistance of counsel.

16
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PAGE FOUR

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Appellant raises three issues on this appeal:

(1)

Did

the Circuit Court err in allowing the prosecutor to introduce
evidence of specific conduct and/or other wrongs by appellant
in order to show his bad character?; (2) Was appellant denied
his right to a fair trial because of alleged improper remarks
in his closing argument?; and (3) Was he denied his rights under
state and federal law to effective assistance of counsel?
II.
A.

OPINION

Evidence of Specific Instances.
The admissibility of character evidence at trial is controlled

by Rules 4 04 and 405 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Rule 404

provides for the conditions under which evidence of a person's
character may be received in evidence.
Evidence of a person's character or
a trait of his character is not admissible
for the purpose of proving that he acted
in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence
of a pertinent trait of his character offered
by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same. . . •
It is clear that the prosecution may properly offer evidence
as to the character of the accused in order to rebut character
evidence offered by the accused on his own behalf.

The defendant

placed his moral character and his character for truthfulness
and veracity in issue when he called character witnesses to

17
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testify in his behalf.

PAGE FIVE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The appellant further opened the door

to allow the prosecution to offer evidence as to appellant's
character when the appellant took the stand to testify as a
witness.

Rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Although the prosecution was free to offer evidence as
to the appellant's character, the admissibility of such evidence
was not without limit.

Rule 405 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

provides that:
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all
cases in which evidence of character or
trait of character of a person is admissible,
proof may be made by testimony as to the
reputation or by testimony in the form of
an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry
is allowable into relevant specific instances
of conduct.
(b)
Specific instances of conduct.
In cases in which character or a trait of
character of a person is an essential element
of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may
also be made of specific instances of his
conduct.
The above language controls the methods in which the prosecution
in this case could properly offer evidence of the appellant's
character.

Evidence of specific instances of appellant's conduct

was properly admissible only on cross-examination or in the
event that the appellant's character was an essential element
of the charge of lewdness.
In State v. Miller, 21 Utah Adv. Rpt. 8 (10/29/85), the
Utah Supreme Court discussed the operation of Rules 404 and

18
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405.

PAGE SIX

MEMORANDUM DECISION

In that case, the defendant in a criminal trial offered

evidence of specific instances regarding his good character.
The trial court, however, refused to allow such evidence.

On

appeal, the Utah Supreme Court stated that although character
evidence may be admissible under Rule 404, counsel seeking to
offer such evidence must deal with the restrictions set forth
in Rule 405.

Id. at 10.

As seen above, Rule 405 provides that

specific instances of conduct may only be admitted into evidence
during cross-examination or where the person's character is
an essential element of the charge against him.

Since the evidence

sought to be offered by the defendant was not on cross-examination,
and since the defendant's character was not Man element of the
crime of sexually abusing a child," the Supreme Court held that
the exclusion of specific instances of conduct was proper under
Rule 405.
Respondent relies upon language found in State v. Green,
578 P.2d 512 (Utah 1978).

The Green case, however, was written

before the adoption of Rules 4 04 and 405 of the current Utah
Rules of Evidence.

In view of this fact, this Court relies

upon the Utah Supreme Court1 s interpretation of the operation
of Rules 404 and 405 as set forth in State v. Miller. 21 Utah
Adv. Rpt. 8 (10/29/85).
In the instant case, the evidence and testimony objected
to by respondents was brought out on direct testimony of the
19
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(Tr., pp 119-24).

The character

of the appellant was not an essential element in proving the
crime of lewdness, West Valley Revised Ordinances, Section 13-9-702,
nor was it an "essential element" of appellant's defenses that
the incident never occurred and he lacked the requisite intent.
Evidence of appellant's character is not required to establish
these defenses.

In view of these circumstances, the trial court

erred in admitting evidence of specific instances of appellant's
prior conduct, although evidence and testimony in the form of
opinion and reputation was properly admissible.

State v. Miller,

21 Utah Adv. Rpt. 8 (10/29/85).
In order for the trial court's error in admitting evidence
of specific instances of appellant's prior conduct to warrant
reversal of the conviction, the trial court's error must have
been prejudicial error.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that

an error of the trial court is prejudicial error and requires
reversal if, in the absence of such error, there is a reasonable
likelihood that there would have been a different result.

State

v. Kosda. 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975); State v. Hodges, 517 P.2d
1322 (Utah 1974).

Excluding all evidence regarding specific

instances of appellant's conduct, the jury still had before
it testimony from four employees of the store where the incident
occurred that the defendant was fully exposed, that such exposure
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was obvious and blatant, and that others in the store noticed
appellants situation.

(Tr., pp 36, 41, 47, 52, 67, 73, 74).

Appellant testified that the exposure of his genitalia
never occurred, and that he was wearing tight-fitting undershorts
underneath his jogging shorts.

(Tr., pp 89-92).

One of the

store employees, however, testified that there was "no way"
the appellant was wearing the tight-fitting undershorts claimed,
or that she was mistaken as to what she saw. (Tr., p 132).
Testimony of the store employees was to the effect that the
appellant entered the store, and that he was fully and obviously
exposed to all present. (Tr., pp 36, 41, 47, 52, 67, 73, 74).
The employees testified that the appellant stood in a line in
front of the credit department for a few minutes, walked into
the toy department for a few minutes, and then went into the
restroom. (Tr., pp 39, 40, 41).

Upon exiting the restroom,

the employees testified that the condition of appellants exposure
was worse than it had been previously.

(Tr., pp 41, 74) . Addition-

ally, there was testimony by the appellant himself, that he
would have had to deliberately hike up his shorts in order to
get them into the situation where he was exposed to the extent
testified to by the store employees.

(Tr., pp 93-94).

Although

the appellant claimed that he was at no time exposed while in
the store, there is substantial competent evidence in the record
supporting appellants conviction for the crime of lewdness,
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and this Court is not persuaded that the improper admission
of the specific instances had any impact on the jury, and can
not say that there is a reasonable likelihood that the result
would have been different.
B.

Prosecutor's Closing Remarks.
Appellants second claim of error is that the appellant

was denied his right to a fair trial due to remarks made by
the prosecutor in his closing argument.

In State v. Valdez.

513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court provided a
two prong test in determining whether improper remarks in closing
argument requires reversal of a conviction.
[T]he test of whether the remarks made by
counsel are so objectionable as to merit
a reversal in a criminal case is, did the
remarks call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they would not be justified
in considering in determining their verdict,
and were they, under the circumstances of
the case, probably influenced by those remarks.
Id. at 426.
This Court must first determine whether or not the closing
argument called to the attention of the jurors matters which
they could not properly consider in determining the guilt or
innocence of the apppellant, and then under the circumstances
of the case whether or not the jurors were influenced by such
remarks.
In closing argument, the prosecutor made the following
statement:
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Counsel finally says that he's [appellant]
guilty of being a slop, not lewdness. I1*!
sorry, it's more than that. It's much more
than that. Do you want people walking into
the stores where you shop, dressed in that
fashion, dangling their genitalia and you're
going to find them not guilty? See, that
presumption of innocence just went out the
window. It's now time for you to decide
this case. If you want these people walking
around in your stores where you shop, then
you're going to find him not guilty. If
you want to put a stop to it, you're going
to find him guilty. You raised your hand,
an obligation, you swore that you would
well and truly try this case. I am asking
you to do what you agreed to do.
(Tr. ,
p 173).
It should be noted, that earlier in his closing remarks,
the prosecutor stressed to the jury that if they were not convinced
of the defendant's guilt, that they should find him not guilty,
and that they could be proud of that decision and hold their
heads high with respect to their performance as jurors. (Tr.,
p 156) . Standing alone, however, the remarks of the prosecutor
quoted above might well have been interpreted by the jurors
to the effect that they had a duty to look beyond the appellant's
guilt or innocence and deal generally with the problem of lewdness
in public places.

It is possible that the jurors would consider,

in addition to the facts regarding the appellant's guilt or
innocence, that a guilty verdict would operate generally to
reduce the problem of lewdness in public places. Such considerations
by the jury would be clearly outside the scope of the jurors'
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proper considerations, and would be improper.

The remarks made

by the prosecutor with regard to stopping "these people11 from
lewdness in public places were improper.
In determining whether or not such remarks warrant reversal
of appellant's conviction, this Court must look to the second
prong of the Valdez test regarding the probable influence of
such remarks on the jury.

The Utah Supreme Court cases cited

by the appellant regarding improper remarks by counsel in closing
argument, indicate that improper remarks by a prosecutor in
closing argument will not warrant reversal of a conviction where
there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the conviction.

State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); State v. Troy,

688 P. 2d 483 (Utah 1983); State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48 (Utah
1983).

In Valdez. the court stated that

,f

if proof of defendant's

guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or remark will not be
presumed prejudicial."
479 P.2d 240 (1971)).

(Quoting State v. Seeaer. 4 ore.App. 336,
In State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah

1985), the Utah Supreme Court held that although the prosecutor's
remarks were "clearly improper" the jury was probably not influenced
by the remarks in view of substantial evidence of the defendants
guilt. As discussed above, the record in the instant case contained
substantial competent evidence supporting the lewdness conviction
and this Court finds that it is unlikely that the result would
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have been different in the absence of the prosecutor's improper
remarks, and that such remarks, therefore, were not prejudicial,
C.

Adequate Assistance of Counsel.
Finally, appellant argues that his conviction should be

reversed on the grounds that he was denied effective assistance
of counsel because defense counsel at trial failed to object
to the improper remarks of the prosecutor in closing argument.
In Strickland v. Washington,

U.S.

, 104 Sup.Ct. 2052,

25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1984), the Supreme Court set forth the standard
in determining whether or not a conviction should be reversed
on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the results of the
proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.
In view of the substantial evidence in the record supporting
the appellant's lewdness conviction, it appears highly unlikely
that the result would have been different had the defense counsel
objected to defendant's remarks, and that appellant's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, therefore, fails under the Strickland
standard.

In fact, in view of the several overruled objections

of defense counsel shortly prior to the prosecutor's closing
remarks, a further objection at the time of the prosecutor's
remarks may possibly have done more harm than good.
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The Utah Supreme Court, in Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d
1101

(Utah 1983), established a more comprehensive

standard

to aid in determining whether or not a conviction should be
set aside or reversed for ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court stated:
(1) The burden of establishing inadequate
representation is on the defendant M and
proof of such must be a demonstrable reality,
and not a speculative matter."
(2)
A lawyer's ,flegitimate exercise
of judgment: in the choice of trial strategy
or tactics that did not produce the anticipated
result does not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel."
(3) It must appear that any deficiency
in the performance of counsel was prejudicial.
In this context, prejudice means that without
counsel's error there was a "reasonable
likelihood that there would have been a
different result."
Counsel for the appellant must satisfy all three of the above
requirements in order to succeed in setting aside or reversing
his conviction.
Under the first two requirements of the Codianna standard,
the appellant must show that the failure to object to the prosecutor's remarks was as "a demonstrable reality" inadequate and
unprofessional representation and further that it was not a
legitimate exercise of judgment or choice of trial strategy.
Under the circumstances of the instant case, it does not appear
that the appellant has met these two tests.

In view of the

several objections of defense counsel (many of which were overruled)
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before the remarks of the prosecutor in closing argument, defense
counsel may reasonably have determined that it was in his client's
best interest not to object.
128, 129, 130, 131).

(Tr., pp 120, 121, 122, 123, 127,

Defense counsel may have felt that the

jury would have reacted adversely to the appellant if another
objection was made and overruled.

Furthermore, the failure

to object may have been based upon defense counsel's reasonable
hopes that the jury would not focus on the remarks, and upon
a reasonable belief that an objection would only focus their
attention on matters which they should not consider.

It appears,

therefore, that defense counsel's decision not to object to
the prosecutor's remarks was a legitimate exercise of professional
judgment, and it is speculative whether or not such decision
constituted an inadequate assistance by counsel.
The third prong of the Codianna standard, requires that
even if defense counsel was inadequate and unprofessional in
his representation of the appellant, appellant's conviction
will not be disturbed unless it is shown that such ineffective
assistance of counsel was prejudicial to the appellant.

As

stated above, the standard in determining whether or not error
in the trial court is prejudicial is whether or not there is
a reasonable likelihood that there would have been a different
result in the absence of the error.

As discussed above, it

does not appear that the appellant was prejudiced by the comment
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by the prosecutor in closing remarks regarding the stopping
of "these people" from engaging in lewd behavior in public places
in view of the substantial competent evidence in the record
supporting the appellants lewdness conviction. This is especially
true when the prosecutor's comments objected to by appellant
are placed into context with the rest of the prosecutor's closing
remarks.
In his closing remarks, the prosecutor stressed to the
jury that if they were not convinced by the evidence admitted
at the trial that the defendant was guilty, then the jurors
were duty bound to find the defendant not guilty, and that they
could thereafter be proud of their decision and of their conduct
as jurors.

(Tr., p 156). The prosecutor also stressed to the

jury that this case was obviously more important to the defendant
than to the City, stating that this is one case in a thousand
for the City, but that this was the defendant's life that was
on trial.

(Tr., p 156).

Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jurors that
the comments and remarks of counsel were not evidence, and that
their decision could only be based upon evidence accepted by
the court.

(Tr., p 144-155).

The jury was also instructed

that they must presume the innocence of the appellant until
they were convinced otherwise by evidence received by the court.
(Tr., p 144-155).
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This Court finds that it is unlikely that the jury was
influenced by the remarks of the prosecutor, and further finds
that it is unlikely that the jury's verdict would have been
different in the absence of such remarks or in the presence
of an objection by defense counsel.
CONCLUSION
This Court finds that the admission of evidence regarding
specific instances of the appellant's conduct, and the comments
by the prosecutor in his closing remarks were improper.

The

Court further finds, however, that in the absence of such evidence
and remarks, it is unlikely that the jury's resulting verdict
would have been different, and that the appellant, therefore,
was not prejudiced thereby.

The appellant's lewdness conviction

is hereby affirmed.
Dated this

2(1

dav of April, 1986.

JUDITH "M. BILLINGS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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R. Spencer Robinson
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Assistant City Attorney
2470 S. Redwood Road
West Valley City, Utah 84119
Ronald J. Yengich
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
72 East 400 South, Suite 355
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient*
performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.
Id.—ILS.at^
, 104 S.Ct at 2064. The
level of judicial scrutiny which defense
counsel's performance must withstand is
highly deferential." Id. — U.S. at
,
104 S.Ct at 2065.
[37] Defendants challenge counsel's assistance in several respects. First, they
assert that defense counsel did not make
his opening statement until the opening of
defendants' case in chief and then, defendants claim, the statement was defective
such that they were "denied the opportunity to present the jury with an intelligent,
cohesive description of their case." Defendants further claim that defense counsel's closing statement was defective. Defendants do not explain why the timing of
the-opening statement was not merely a
'legitimate exercise of judgment" State
v. McNicol, 554 P.2d at 205. As to the
quality of the opening and closing state
ments, defendants do not even attempt to
demonstrate how counsel's representation
in this regard "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, —
U.S. at
, 104 S.Ct at 2065. "The object
of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade
counsel's performance." Id. —- U.S. at
, 104 S.Ct. at 2070. The record does
not reveal and defendants make no showing that the opening and closing state19. The Strickland court explained its reasoning:
It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy
for a court, examining counsel's defense after
it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a
particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. Cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 VS. 107,
133-134, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1574-1575, 71
L.£d.2d 783 (1982). A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of

ments support a claim of ineffectiveness of
counsel.
Defendants also claim that trial counsel's
failure to move to strike the testimony of
four State witnesses reflects ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendants allege
that the witnesses, Craig Duvall, Christine
Swanson, Iinia Teniaki, and Kelly Powers,
"offered no probative testimony as to the
truth of the allegations." Defendants are
not specific regarding any objections, the
grounds for the proposed motion to strike,
or whether it was likely the trial court
would have granted such a request Furthermore, as a result of repeated objections
to the witnesses' testimony by defense
counsel, nothing therein may be remotely
characterized as harmful or prejudicial to
the defense.
Defendants next argue that trial counsel
was ineffective when he attempted to impeach a State witness based on prior inconsistent statements from a preliminary hearing without requesting transcripts from the
hearing. As noted previously, defendants
have not provided those transcripts as part
of the record on appeal. Nor do defendants explain the content of the inconsistent
statements and how they would have been
helpful. Without more, we cannot consider
whether this point of error represents ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendants also challenge the trial counsel's assistance with respect to his failure
to elicit character witness testimony. The
record indicates the contrary. Despite repeated
objections,
defense
counsel
managed to elicit much positive testimony
from the character witnesses. We therecounsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate
the conduct from counsel's perspective at the
time. Because of the difficulties inherent in
making the evaluation, a court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is the defendant
must overcome the presumption that, under
the circumstances, the challenged action
"might be considered sound trial strategy."
See Michel v. New York, supra, 350 VS. 91 at
101, 76 S.Ct. 158 at 164, 100 L.Ed. «3.
ULt — VS. at
. 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66.
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APPENDIX "C"
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WEST VALLEY CITY,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NO.

CRA-86-9

:

KENNETH H. RISLOW,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

The Court on request of counsel for the defendant heard
oral argument on this appeal from the Fifth Circuit Court, West
Valley Department on May 19, 1986.

The plaintiff was represented

by Spencer Robinson, Assistant City Attorney, and the defendant
by Ronald Yengich, Esq.

The Court agreed to reconsider its

Memorandum Decision issued on April 28, 1986, as counsel for
the defendant had not been given an opportunity to respond by
way of written Memoranda or oral argument to the City's Memorandum
of Points and Authorities.
On rehearing the defendant argues that this case should
be governed by State of Utah v. Derrick Andreason. No. 20616,
Filed May 6, 1986, Utah Supreme Court.

The defendant urges

that an essential element of the crime of which the defendant
was convicted is intent: that under circumstances where the
defendant should have had knowledge that he was exposed, that
he knowingly exposed himself.

Counsel states that the evidence
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as to the defendant's intent was circumstantial, and was conflicting,
and thus that this is exactly the circumstance where the prosecutorf s
improper closing argument was probably instrumental in the jury's
finding of guilt.

The Court in Andreason. supra# states:

When the evidence in the record is circumstantial
or sufficiently conflicting, jurors are
more likely influenced by improper argument.
In such cases they are more susceptible
to the suggestion that factors other than
the evidence before them should determine
a defendant's guilt or innocence. Considering
all the facts and circumstances of this
case, we conclude that the jury was probably
influenced by the improper closing remarks
in view of the highly marginal nature of
any evidence of criminal intent or knowledge
on the part of the defendant, a reasonable
likelihood exists that in the absence of
the prosecutor's prejudicial argument, there
might have been a different result.
Id. at page 4.
The Court has reviewed again the transcript of the hearing,
and agrees that the evidence on intent was conflicting and circumstantial.

The Court has already held in the prior Memorandum

Decision that the prosecutor's remarks during closing statement
were improper.

However, it is undisputed that counsel for the

defendant did not object to these remarks at the time of trial.
Therefore, in order to find a reversal, this Court would have
to find that trial counsel's failure to object to the improper
statement of the prosecutor resulted in inadequate assistance
of counsel.

As stated in the Court's prior Memorandum Decision,

this Court cannot agree with that premise.

33

Therefore, even

WEST VALLEY V. RISLOW

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

though if a proper objection had been made, this Court may have
had grounds for reversal, the Court does not believe that the
failure to make such an objection rises to the level of inadequate
representation of counsel.

As more fully discussed at pp. 12-16

of the Court's prior Memorandum Decision, defense counsel's
decision not to object to the prosecutor's remarks was a legitimate
exercise of professional judgment and not inadequate representation.
Based upon the above, the Court reaffirms its affirmance
of the conviction of the defendant.
Dated this

29th

day of May, 1986.

JUDITH/M.^BILLINGS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following, this

day of May, 1986:

Richard Spencer Robinson »
Assistant City Prosecutor
Attorney for Plaintiff
2470 S. Redwood Road
West Valley City, Utah 84119
Ronald J. Yengich
Attorney for Defendant
72 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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UNITED STATES v. GUSTAFSON

1079

CU* a* 728 FM1078 (ISM)

asing black representation; and that his fraud, and conspiracy. One defendant
retaries did not like him.
agreed, pursuant to a plea bargain, to plead
'he district court rejected appellant's to one count of mail fraud and testify on
m stating:
behalf of the Government. The United
Vhat Plaintiff seems not to realize is States District Court for the District of
hat it is a trait of human nature that Minnesota, Edward J. Devitt, J., granted
ome people instinctively resent a situa- judgments of acquittal to two defendants,
ion wherein a person "from the outside" ^ f t e r a jury verdict, two defendants were
i brought in, given a full associate prfe convicted of all counts, and one defendant
essorship, moved "ahead" of severaMac- was convicted of 11 counts. Appeal was
Ity members already employed at the taken. The Court of Appeals, Ross, Circuit
Jniversity, and given arr unusual twelve- Judge, held that: (1) letter of bank examinlonth contract rather than the usual er, which was introduced to show that deine-month contract, regardless of the
fendants had knowledge and notice that
ace of the person involved.
suspicious "check floating" activity had ocF.Supp. at 124. The court determined
curred at bank and that it was deemed
t the work environment was not so polid with discrimination as to substantially misapplication of funds by bank examiners,
ect appellant's employment, and that the was properly introduced under rule pertainlor animosity which existed toward Dr. ing to "other crimes" evidence; (2) fact
liver was not grounded in race. See that codefendants had agreed after trial to
»iddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, give information to Government in ex., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir.1977). This find- change for a more lenient sentence did not
is not clearly erroneous. See Wagh, constitute newly discovered evidence entitling one of the defendants to a new trial;
>ra, 705 F.2d at 1021.
Ve have studied appellant's remaining and (3) trial court did not abuse its discre;uments and find them to be without tion in refusing to rule in advance on derit. Accordingly, we affirm the judg- fendant's motion in limine requesting that
nt of the district court.
Government not be allowed to broach defendant's second indictment in cross-examination of acquitted codefendant who de[ ? |KCTNUIM£RSVSTEII>
fendant wished to call to testify for the
defense.
MTED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Deil Otto GUSTAFSON, Appellant.
tITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Ralph Edwin BRUINS, Appellant
Nos. 83-1631, 83-1653.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Dec. 12, 1983.
Decided Feb. 29, 1984.
Rehearing Denied March 30,1984.
Six defendants were indicted for false
try on bank records, mail fraud, wire

Affirmed.

1. Criminal Law <*=> 369.2(1)
Requirements which must be met for
"other crimes" evidence to be admissible
under rule of evidence are: (1) a material
issue on which other crimes evidence may
be admissible has been raised; (2) proffered
evidence is relevant to the issue; and (3)
evidence of the other crimes is clear and
convincing. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 404(b), 28
U.S.C.A.
2. Criminal Law <*=»371(1), 372(1)
To be admissible on such issues as intent, knowledge, or plan, "other crimes"

evidence must relate to wrongdoing similar
in kind and reasonably close in time to the
charge at trial.
Fed.Rules Evid.Rule
404(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
3. Criminal Law ** 369.1
Evidence admissible under rule of evidence pertaining to other crimes may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.Rules Evid.Rules 403, 404(b), 28
U.S.C.A.
4. Criminal Law <»=» 369.2(1)
Rule pertaining to admission of "other
crimes" evidence is one of inclusion because
it allows admission of evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts relevant to an issue
in the trial, unless it tends only to prove
criminal disposition. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule
404(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
5. Criminal Law *-369.2(1), 1153(1)
Trial court is vested with broad discretion in deciding whether to admit wrongful
act evidence, and decision to admit such
evidence will only be reversed when it is
clear that questioned evidence has no bearing upon any of the issues involved at trial.
Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 404(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
6. Criminal Law <t=>369.2(3)
Letter of bank examiner to bank board
of directors, which was introduced at trial
as evidence which tended to show that defendants had knowledge and notice that
suspicious "floating" activity had occurred
at bank and was deemed a misapplication of
funds by bank examiners, was properly introduced in prosecution for false entry on
bank records, notwithstanding claim that it
was introduced only to show that defendants had propensity toward criminal behavior, since letter was relevant to rebut defense claim that defendants were innocent
because they relied on subordinates to handle such day-to-day transactions. Fed.
Rules Evid.Rule 404(b), 28 U.S.C.A.; 18
U.S.C.A. § 1005.
7. Criminal Law «»338(1)
Evidence is relevant when it serves to
rebut defense that a person has justifiably

relied upon subordinates to handle business
matters.
8. Criminal Law *»374
With regard to requirement that in order to be admissible, evidence of "other
crimes" must be clear and convincing, proffered evidence cannot be admitted if it is of
vague and uncertain character. Fed.Rules
Evid.Rule 404(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
9. Criminal Law «=»374
In order to be admissible under clear
and convincing standard, prior conduct cannot be equally consistent with an innocent
explanation. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 404(b),
28 U.S.C.A.
10. Criminal Law «=* 369.2(3)
Evidence of prior conduct relating to
improper check "float" which occurred
when bank credited defendant's account
with check prior to its collection was admissible in prosecution for false entry on bank
records, since evidence was clear and convincing, it was related to wrongdoing similar in kind and reasonably close in time to
charge at trial, and its probative value substantially outweighed the danger of unfair
prejudice. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1005; Fed.Rules
Evid.Rule 404(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
11. Criminal Law *=» 673(5)
A limiting instruction telling jury not
to consider evidence of other acts as substantive proof but only as proof of notice or
knowledge of a prior incident diminishes
danger of any unfair prejudice arising from
admission of evidence of other acts.
12. Criminal Law «=> 938(1)
Before motion for new trial on ground
of newly discovered evidence can be granted, five criteria must be met: (1) evidence
must be in fact newly discovered, that is,
discovered since the trial; (2) facts must be
alleged from which court may infer diligence on part of movant; (3) evidence relied upon must not be merely cumulative or
impeaching; (4) it must be material to the
issues involved; and (5) it must be of such
nature that, on a new trial, the newly discovered evidence would probably produce
acquittal.
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L Criminal Law *=»938(1), 1156(3)
Motions for a new trial on ground of
wly discovered evidence are looked upon
th disfavor, and Court of Appeals will not
erturn trial court's decision with regard
such a motion absent a clear abuse of
tcretion.
. Criminal Law *=» 938(2)
Fact that codefendants in prosecution
r false entry on bank records/mail and
re fraud, and conspiracy, agreed after trito give information to Government in
change for more lenient sentence did not
nstitute newly discovered evidence enting defendant to a new trial, notwithmding defendant's contention that codefidants would not now try to implicate
n in their crime and that their testimony
>uld be much more credible since, followr. their agreement, they would be on
vemment's side.
Criminal Law *= 632(4)
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
refusing to rule in advance on motion in
line requesting that Government not be
owed to broach a second indictment of
fendant in cross-examination of acquitted
lefendant who defendant wished to call
testify for the defense.
fames M. Rosenbaum, U.S. Atty., Doug*
A. Kelley, Asst. U.S. Atty., Dist. of
nn., Minneapolis, Minn., James L. For*
n, Legal Intern, for appellee.
Terence P. Durkin, Dudley & Smith, St.
til, Minn., Albert J. Krieger, Susan W.
n Dusen, Albert J. Krieger, P.A., Miami,
i., for appellant Deil Otto Gustafson.
Jefore HEANEY, ROSS and FAGG, Cirt Judges.
.OSS, Circuit Judge.
)n November 5, 1981, defendants Agosto,
stafson, Newstrum, Bruins, Bacigalupo
The Honorable Edward J Devui, Senior
udge, United States District Court for the Disict of Minnesota.

and Norris were named in a 31 count indictment that charged violations of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1005 (false entry on bank records), 1341
(mail fraud), 1343 (wire fraud), and 371
(conspiracy). Newstrum agreed, pursuant
to a plea bargain, to plead to one count of
mail fraud and testify on behalf of the
^ government. A jury trial began in United
States District Court for the District of
Minnesota' on January 3, 1981. On January 14, the court granted judgments of
acquittal to defendants Bacigalupo and
Norris. On January 23, the jury returned
its verdict: Agosto was convicted on all
counts; Gustafson was convicted on all
counts; and Bruins was convicted of 11
counts. » n May 3, the district court imposed the following sentences: Agosto received 20 years and a $63,000 fine; Gustafson received 10 years and an $81,000 fine;
and Bruins received 3 years and a $20,000
fine. Costs were imposed against Agosto
and Gustafson. On August 29, 1983, defendant Agosto died of a heart attack.
On appeal, defendants Bruins and Gustafson raise the following issues: 1) whether government exhibit 500 was improperly
admitted under rule 404(b); 2) whether the
trial court erred in denying Bruins' motion
for a new trial; and 3) whether the trial
court erred in refusing to rule on Gustafson's motion in limine to restrict the
government's cross-examination of Bacigalupo.2 For the reasons discussed herein, we
affirm.
/.

General Background

Defendant Gustafson, during the relevant
time period, owned 20 percent of the Tropicana Hotel and Casino. Gustafson also
owned the Summit National Bank of Saint
Paul, Summit State Bank of Richfield,
Summit State Bank of Phalen Park, Summit State Bank of South Saint Paul, and
Summit State Bank of Bloomington. Defendant Newstrum was Gustafson's "right2. Prior to oral argument. Gustalson moved to
strike the affidavit of Michael Ferrence. Jr.,
from the record As it appears that this affidavit was never presented to the trial court, the
motion to strike is granted
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hand man" in the operation of the various tafson owned Marlee, Inc. The opening
corporations. Defendant Agosto was the deposit was a $300,000 personal check of Ed
owner of Production and Leasing (P & L), a Legg drawn on a Las Vegas bank. Prior to
Nevada corporation, which provided the Fo- collection, the bank had paid $169,000 of
lies Bergere floor show to the Tropicana for checks written on the account. The Legg
the sum of $60,000 per week. Defendant check was not collected as payment was
Norris was employed by Agosto at P & L as stopped, thus, a $169,000 overdraft was crean administrative secretary.
Defendant ated in the account. Two days later, GusBruins was the president of the Summit tafson deposited a check drawn on an EthiBank of Richfield and acted as a consultant opian bank which was valued at approxito the Summit National Bank. Defendant mately $300,000. The item was sent to a
Bacigalupo was the vice president and cash- Minneapolis bank for collection. However,
ier at the Summit National Bank and per- on the same day, Summit Richfield gave the
sonally handled the Tropicana and P A L Marlee account a $300,000 credit which covaccounts at that bank.
ered the overdraft. On September 16,1975,
The subject of this criminal prosecution the foreign check was still uncollected and
was a check floating scheme which was Gustafson assured the board of directors
conducted to fraudulently assist the Tropi- that he would personally pay the overdraft
cana and P & L's financial position by pro- by September 30 if the check did not clear.
viding interest-free loans to both enterpris- The overdraft was paid by Gustafson on
es by the Summit Banks of Saint Paul and that date.
Richfield during the years of 1977 and 1978.
After the bank was examined in 1975,
The Tropicana obtained an improper loan
Chief Examiner Joseph Yogel wrote a letter
from the Summit Bank of Saint Paul by
to the board of directors at Summit Richusing the bank as its depository bank for
field dated December 1, 1975. The letter
Tropicana employees' federal withholding
characterized the Marlee transaction as a
taxes. P & L obtained its loans by using
"direct misapplication of bank funds" with
two Summit banks as its depository for
attendant "fictitious entries" on the bank's
federal withholding taxes and by opening
books. It named Gustafson, Newstrum,
commercial checking accounts at both
and Bruins as the persons responsible and
banks. The Tropicana and P & L made
stated that reports had been submitted to
deposits to these accounts in the form of
the United States attorney and the FBI.
nonsufficient fund (NSF) checks. The
Bruins responded to the letter and indicated
banks treated these as cash (collected) items
that he and Gustafson were concerned but
and used bank funds to pay Tropicana and
felt that they handled the situation properP & L obligations. When the checks were
returned as dishonored, the banks would ly. No charges were filed. The Vogel letaccept new NSF checks to replace them. ter, government exhibit 500, was introduced
This process would continue until the de- at trial as evidence which tended to show
fendants decided to pay with "good" checks. the defendants had knowledge and notice
In order to conceal this "float" scheme, that suspicious "floating" activity had ocofficers of both banks had to make false curred at the bank and was deemed a misentries on the books to avoid arousing the application of funds by the bank examiners.
suspicions of bank examiners. This scheme
allowed the Tropicana and P & L to continue day-to-day operations in spite of severe
cash flow shortages.
During the trial, the government produced evidence that Marlee, Inc., a Nevada
corporation that owned the Gamblers Hall
of Fame casino, opened a checking account
at Summit Richfield in July of 1975. Gus-

The testimony of trial witnesses established that by the spring of 1978, there were
so many checks and replacement checks in
the clearing process that the handling of
such checks became almost impossible.
Agosto ordered his people to consolidate 17
Tropicana checks into two checks, payable
to P & L, in the amounts of $660,000 and
$360,000, respectively. These checks were
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deposited into the P & L account at Summit
Richfield. When these checks were dishonored by the Valley Bank of Nevada, the
Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis,
Summit Richfield's correspondent bank, became quite alarmed. By May 16, 1978, the
Marquette Bank had refused to extend provisional credit to Summit until those deposits had been collected.
This precipitated a crisis for the Summit
Banks and led to what was labeled the
'Jane Lannin Affair^ at trial. Bruins telephoned Gustafson to inform him of the
problem created by the Marquette Bank,
justafson summoned Newstrum and put
Bruins' call on a speaker phone. Bruins
suggested that the Tropicana open new accounts at other Summit Banks which did
lot clear through the Marquette Bank.
Newstrum was ordered to call Las Vegas
md have blank Tropicana checks sent to
Minnesota and delivered to Bruins. Newst•um called Jane Lannin and told her to
irive to the Minneapolis Airport, pick up a
(peed pack from the Tropicana, deliver it to
Bruins and await further instructions.
When Lannin arrived at the bank, Bruins
nstructed her to open new accounts at two
)ther Summit Banks in the name of Hotel
Conquistador, Inc. When Lannin opened
the new accounts, she drew checks payable
.o Summit National as directed by Bruins.
The plan never achieved its desired effect
because the bank examiners entered the
sank before the checks could be presented
for collection. Newstrum testified that
justafson told him to lie to the FBI about
Lhe "Jane Lannin Affair" and to shift the
•esponsibility from Minnesota to the people
n Las Vegas.

//. Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or
Acts
Government exhibit 500, the letter of
Chief Bank Examiner Vogel, was admitted
into evidence and went to the jury. Appellants assert that the admission of such evidence was an abuse of Rule 404(b) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.1 Appellants
contend that the government introduced
this evidence to show that they had a propensity towards criminal behavior. Under
Rule 404(b), such evidence is not admissible
to prove the bad character of the defendant, but may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, knowledge,
or intent. United States v. Goehring, 585
F.2d 371, 372 (8th Cir.1978).

On Monday, May 22, 1978, the federal
>ank examiners entered Summit National
ind Summit Richfield and discovered that
52,400,000 worth of checks were in float.
Since this exceeded the capital of the bank,
here was concern that the bank would fail,
justafson borrowed $1,500,000 from a local

[1-3] The standards in this circuit for
the admission of other wrongs or acts evidence for such purposes are well established:
Our cases reveal certain requirements
which must be met for other crimes evi-

I. Rule 404(b) reads as follows:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he acted in conformity

therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

bank to pay off floating checks. Agosto,
through wire transfers, was able to pay off
all but $220,000 at Summit National and
$141,000 at Summit Richfield.
It appears that after the above payments
were made, Gustafson and Bacigalupo set
about to try to cover the remaining deficiency. On June 21, 1978, two miscellaneous credit slips to the P & L account were
filed showing cash deposits of $110,000 and
$109,000, respectively. These slips bore the
initials of Bacigalupo as the responsible
bank official. No currency transaction reports were filed. Furthermore, suspicious
loans had been made earlier in the same
day. These transactions are the subject of
a seconir* indictment in which Bacigalupo
and Gustafson were charged with failure to
file currency reports and for false entries
on bank books. That case had not been
tried prior to the trial of the instant case.

dence to be admissible under the rule: (1)
a material issue on which other crimes
evidence may be admissible has been
raised, e.g., United States v. Drury, 582
F.2d 1181, 1184 (8th Cir.1978); United
States v. Maestas, 554 F.2d 834, 837 (8th
Cir.), cert denied, 431 U.S. 972, 97 S.Ct.
2936,53 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1977); (2) the proffered evidence is relevant to that issue,
ibid.; (3) the evidence of the other crimes
is clear and convincing, e.g., United
States v. Cobb, 588 F.2d 607, 612 (8th
Cir.1978), cert, denied, [440 U.S. 947], 99
S.Ct 1426, 59 L.Ed.2d 636 (1979); United
States v. Drury, supra, 582 F.2d at 1184;
United States v. Davis, 551 F.2d 233, 234
(8th Cir.), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 923, 97
S.Ct 2197, 53 L.Ed.2d 237 (1977). In
addition, to be admissible on such issues
as intent, knowledge, or plan, the other
crimes evidence must relate to wrongdoing "similar in kind and reasonably close
in time to the charge at trial." United
States v. Drury, supra, 582 F.2d at 1184.
See, e.g., United States v. Little, 562 F.2d
578, 581 (8th Cir.1977); United States v.
Jardan, 552 F.2d 216, 219 (8th Cir.), cert,
denied, 433 U.S. 912, 97 S.Ct. 2982, 53
L.Ed.2d 1097 (1977). Finally, evidence
otherwise admissible under Rule 404(b)
may be excluded under Fed.REvid. 403,
"if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice • • V
United States v. Burchinal, 657 F.2d 985,
993 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1086,
102 S.Ct 646, 70 L.Ed.2d 622 (1981) quoting
United States v. Frederickson, 601 F.2d
1358, 1365 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S.
934, 100 S.Ct 281, 62 L.Ed.2d 193 (1979).
[4,5] Rule 404(b) is one of inclusion because it allows the admission of evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts relevant to an
issue in the trial, unless it tends only to
prove criminal disposition. United States v.
Wagoner, 713 F.2d 1371,1375 (8th Cir.1983).
The trial court is vested with broad discretion in deciding whether to admit wrongful
act evidence. United States v. Evans, 697
F.2d 240, 248 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, —
U.S.
, 103 S.Ct 1779, 76 L.Ed.2d 352
(1983). The decision to admit such evidence

will only be reversed when it is clear that
the questioned evidence has no bearing
upon any of the issues involved at trial.
United States v. Marshall, 683 F.2d 1212,
1215 (8th Cir.1982).
[6,7] In the present case, we find that
all of the standards for admission were met;
thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. At trial, a material issue on which
evidence of other acts may be admissible
was raised when the appellants' defense
consisted of claiming they were innocent
because they relied on their subordinates to
handle these day-to-day transactions. Furthermore, government exhibit 500 is relevant to that issue. Evidence is relevant
when it serves to rebut a defense that a
person had justifiably relied upon subordinates to handle business matters. See
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 678, 95
S.Ct 1903, 1914, 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975).
[8-10] We also find that the evidence of
other acts was clear and convincing. To
meet the clear and convincing standard, the
proffered evidence cannot be admitted if it
is of vague and uncertain character. United States v. demons, 503 F.2d 486, 490 (8th
Cir.1974). Furthermore, the prior conduct
cannot be equally consistent with an innocent explanation. Id. The uncontradicted
evidence showed that the Ethiopian check
was treated as a cash item and credited to
Gustafson's account on the same day it was
sent to Minneapolis for collection. Additional checks were then written on the account after it was given credit and prior to
collection. We find it clear that an improper "float" occurred due to the bank giving
credit to Gustafson's account. Under this
same analysis, we find that the evidence
related to wrongdoing similar in kind and
reasonably close in time to the charge at
trial.
[11] Finally, we find that the evidence
was properly admitted because its probative
value was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. This court
would find it quite difficult to rule that the
admission of government exhibit 500 caused
the appellants to be convicted on an im-
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proper basis. Moreover, the trial court
gave a limiting instruction telling the jury
not to consider such evidence as substantive
proof but only as proof of notice or knowledge of a prior incident. Such an instruction diminishes the danger of any unfair
prejudice arising from the admission of evidence of other acts. United States v.
Goehring, supra, 585 F.2d at 373.
///.

Bruins' Motion for a New *Trial

Bruins asserts ttyat "because Gustafson
and Agosto agreed, after trial, to give information to the government in exchange
for a more lenient sentence, newly discovered evidence now exists that would justify
granting him a new trial. Bruins submits
that now Gustafson and Agosto would not
try to implicate him in their crime and their
testimony would be much more credible as
they are now "on the government's side."
Bruins argues that since this was unavailable during the first trial, it constitutes newly discovered evidence.
[12,13] This court has set forth the criteria for granting a motion for a new trial
on the ground of newly discovered evidence
on numerous occasions. Before such a motion can be granted, the following five criteria must be met:
(1) the evidence must be in fact newly
discovered, that is, discovered since the
trial; (2) facts must be alleged from
which the court may infer diligence on
the part of the movant; (3) the evidence
relied upon must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) it must be material to the issues involved; and (5) it must
be of such nature that, on a new trial, the
newly discovered evidence would probably produce an acquittal.
United States v. Swarek, 677 F.2d 41, 43
(8th Cir.1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1102,
103 S.Ct. 723, 74 L.Ed.2d 949 (1983). It is
also well settled that such motions are
looked upon with disfavor and we will not
overturn the trial court's decision absent a
clear abuse of discretion United States v.
Pope, 415 F.2d 685 (8th Cir.1969), cert, denied, 397 U.S. 950, 90 S.Ct. 973, 25 L.Ed.2d
132 (1970).

[14] We find that the showing made in
support of the motion for new trial does not
satisfy the criteria set out in Swarek. The
court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion.
IV.

Gustafson's Motion in Limine

[15] At the close of the government's
case, the court granted a judgment of acquittal to Bacigalupo. As he was available
as a witness, Gustafson announced his intention to call Bacigalupo to testify for the
defense. The government advised that, if
Bacigalupo was called, its cross-examination
would include the subject matter of the
second indictment pending against Bacigalupo ana Gustafson. Gustafson made a motion in limine requesting that the government not be allowed to broach the second
indictment in cross-examination. The trial
court refused to rule in advance on the
motion and Gustafson chose not to call Bacigalupo to the stand.
Gustafson asserts that this court's decision in United States v. Burkhead, 646 F.2d
1283 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 898,
102 S.Ct. 399,70 L.Ed.2d 214 (1981), compels
a finding of reversible error. We disagree.
In Burkhead, the court found reversible error when a trial court failed to rule in
advance on whether a defendant could be
cross-examined regarding events underlying his conviction on severed substantive
counts as it was determinative of his desire
to take the stand. We find that Gustafson's reliance on Burkhead is misplaced.
The court in Burkhead held that in the
usual case the judge has discretion to refuse
to rule in advance, however, this case was
so outside the ordinary that a refusal to
rule in advance on a matter determinative
of the defendant's desire to take the stand
constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. at
1285. Thus, Burkhead is the exception and
the instant case is covered by the general
rule. The court did not abuse its discretion.
V.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the convictions
are affirmed.

LOVING SAVIOUR CHURCH, an
unincorporated religious
association, Appellant,
UNITED STATES of America, Robert F.
Cunningham, Robert F. Turner, George
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Eighth Circuit
Submitted Dec. 15, 1983.
Decided Feb. 29, 1984.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
Denied March 27, 1984.
Church brought wrongful levy action
arising from seizure of property by the Internal Revenue Service. The United States
District Court for the District of South
Dakota, John B. Jones, J., 556 F.Supp. 688,
entered judgment, and church appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that property
held in name of church could be levied on to
satisfy tax liabilities of individual taxpayers
who had set up the church.
Affirmed.

gen, U.S. Atty., Sioux Falls, S.D., of counsel.
Q a r y H H e m m i n g e r , Hemminger & Frederiksen, Englewood, Colo., for appellant
Before HEANEY, ROSS and FAGG, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
The Internal Revenue Service levied upon
and seized a building in Huron, South Dakota; a 40-acre tract of farmland; three motor vehicles and two bank accounts in connection with the federal income tax liability
of Dr. Albert A. Anderson and Myrtle G.
Anderson. Title to all the property was
held by the plaintiff, Loving Saviour
Church, an unincorporated association. The
bank accounts were in the name of Loving
Saviour Church and the Anderson Business
Trust. This action for a preliminary injunction to secure the release of the property
and for damages resulting from the levy
was brought under 26 U.S.C. § 7426. Loving Saviour Church appeals from an ad*
verse decision in the district court 1 which
held that the IRS properly levied upon the
property to satisfy the Andersons' tax liabilities.
Background

Internal Revenue *»4857
Taxpayers fraudulently conveyed property to a church to avoid federal tax lien
and church was alter ego of the taxpayers,
who were fully supported by funds and
property of the church they created in
whatever style they themselves chose; thus,
property held in name of church could be
levied on to satisfy individual taxpayers'
tax liabilities.

In 1975 the Andersons purchased some
trust forms from a person involved in the
tax protest movement, set up the A & M
Family Trust, and transferred all their
property to the trust In 1976, a new A k
M Family Trust and an Anderson Business
Trust were set up to replace the 1975 trust.
In 1977 the Andersons received Doctor of
Divinity degrees from the Life Science
Church and set up their own church which
later became the Loving Saviour Church.

Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen.,
Michael L. Paup, Gary R. Allen, Stanley S.
Shaw, Jr., Tax Div., Dept of Justice, Washington, D.C., for appellees; Philip N. Ho-

After taking a vow of poverty, Dr. Anderson transferred all the property from
the A & M Family Trust and the Anderson
Business Trust to the church for no consid-

1. The Honorable John B. Jones, United States
District Court, District of South Dakota, South-

ern Division.
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ble from this case on its facts. There the
Post's story was based almost entirely on a
source previously unknown to the defendants, whom they knew to have a criminal
record. Obvious avenues for checking the
facts and allegations in the story were ignored, even though the editors had actual
warning that much of it was false. The
critical difference in this case is that Brooks
relied on two reputable sources, and there
was nothing to indicate to him that their
information, or his synthesis of it, was not
wholly accurate. Moreover, his reason for
including the sentence about Ryan was his
desire to make the book a balanced, objective history of AT&T. Certainly the Southern Bell controversy was worthy of mention
in a history of the telephone company, and
a rule of liability that could cause authors
to avoid such controversial topics for fear of
damage judgments would ultimately reduce
the flow of information to the public
Our reading of this case is fully in line
with the decisions in other circuits that
have applied the New York Times standard.
As long as the sources of the libelous information appeared reliable, and the defendant had no doubts about its accuracy, the
courts have held the evidence of malice
insufficient to support a jury verdict, even
if a more thorough investigation might
have prevented the admitted error. See
Dickey v. CBS Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1227 (3d
Cir. 1978); Holchncr v. Castillo-Puche, 661
F.2d 910, 912-14 (2d Cir. 1977); Grzelak v.
Calumet Publishing Co.$ 543 F.2d 579, 583
(7th Cir. 1975); Vandenburg v. Newsweek,
tiff, included evidence that the defendant had
described the plaintiffs appearance and expression, and had quoted her in his article even
though she clearly was not at home when he
visited. Id. at 253. 95 S.Ct. at 470.
•. The court's instructions on actual malice
were as follows:
The courts have set out this standard in
various ways; that is, they have defined it
some ten or twelve years ago, the first time
the Supreme Court dealt expressly with this
problem. They defined actual malice as publication with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not. In other cases, it's been referred
to as highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards

507 F.2d at 1026-28; Drotzmann's, Inc. v.
McGraw-Hill Inc., 500 F.2d 830, 834 (8th
Cir. 1974). In two cases in which the evidence of malice was found to be sufficient,
by contrast, the facts indicated strongly
that the challenged allegations had been
completely fabricated by the writer. See
Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206,213
(7th Cir. 1976); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d
731, 735-36 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
The trial court below submitted this case
to the jury with the instruction that they
must find the element of actual malice on
the part of defendants in order to find them
liable. The court's definition of malice,
however, was too broad, in that it included
Justice Harlan's standard from Butts,
which has since been rejected by a majority
of the Court, and which may have confused
the jury by indicating that a finding of
negligence would suffice for malice.9 Defendants, however, did not object to the
inclusion of this definition. They did request the court, after it had finished the
instructions but before the jury retired, to
reopen the instructions and include the language of the St. Amant case, which the
court refused. Though we do not say it
was error for the court to refuse to include
this belated offering, we disagree with its
conclusion that the St. Amant language
would be inappropriate to the circumstances
of this case. The St. Amant language has
been cited frequently in subsequent decisions of the Court, including very recent
ones," and it has never been limited to suits
brought by public officials.
of investigative reporting ordinarily adhered
to by responsible publishers. In another
case, it was said there must be sufficient
evidence to permit the conclusion that the
defendant, in fact, entertained serious doubts
as to the truth of his publication. In another
it was referred to as knowing falsehood or
reckless disregard of the truth, and then I
believe the most recent case, which is now
several years old, the Court again stated the
original proposition that publication with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.
10. See Herbert v. Undo, 441 U.S. 153. 156, 99
S.Ct 1635. 1638. 60 L Ed.2d 115 (1979); Gertz
v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. at 332, 94 S.Ct. 2997,
3003. 41 L.Ed.2d 789.
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We need not decide, however, whether
the instructions were so prejudicial as to
constitute "plain error" and a basis for reversal. The defendants have properly challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, and
on that basis we have followed the Supreme
Court's lead in First Amendment cases and
have conducted an independent examination of the record as a whole to determine
whether the judgment constitutes "a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks,
389 U.S. 81, 82, 88 S.Ct. 197, 198-199, 19
L.Ed.2d 248 (1967). We find the evidence
of actual malice insufficient to present a
jury question in light of the constitutional
standard, and we therefore reverse.
REVERSED.

and chose, instead, to devote her time to
demanding personal needs of her patients,
testimony of auditor for United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare
that defendant in billing for medicaid services reported four times as many services
per patient as other Virginia doctors was
admissible under rule providing for admissibility of evidence of other crimes, etc., to
prove preparation, plan, knowledge, absence
of mistake or accident, etc.

WIDENER, Circuit Judge, concurs in the
result
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UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Eileen Eldorado JOHNSON, Appellant
No. 79-5272.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit
Argued Aug. 19, 1980.
Decided Nov. 12, 1980.
A medical doctor was convicted of federal income tax evasion, and new trial was
denied by the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia at
Lynchburg, James C. Turk, Chief Judge.
Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, James Dickson Phillips, Circuit
Judge, held that where defendant at trial
claimed inadvertence, claiming she had had
nothing to do with preparing her tax returns because she cared nothing for money

Affirmed.
Widener, Circuit Judge, dissented and
filed opinion.
1. Criminal Law «»370, 372(14)
In prosecution for federal income tax
evasion wherein defendant at trial claimed
inadvertence, claiming she had nothing to
do with preparing her tax returns because
she cared nothing for money and chose,
instead, to devote her time to demanding
personal needs of her patients, testimony of
auditor for United States Department of
Health, Education and Welfare that defendant in billing for medicaid services reported four times as many services per patient as other Virginia doctors was admissible under rule providing for admissibility of
evidence of other crimes, etc., to prove
preparation, plan, knowledge, absence of
mistake or accident etc. 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 7201; Fed.Rules Evid. Rule 404(b), 28
U.S.C.A.
1 Criminal Law *=»369.1
First sentence of rule concerning admissibility of evidence of other crimes, etc.,
brings forward traditional rule that extrinsic acts evidence is inadmissible solely to
prove that defendant is of bad character
and therefore likely to have committed
crime charged.
Fed.Rules Evid. Rule
404(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
3. Criminal Law *=>369.2(1)
Extrinsic acts evidence may be admissible for other purposes than those listed in
rule concerning admissibility of such evidence, list provided by the rule being merely illustrative and not exclusive. Fed.Rules
Evid. Rule 404(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
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In determining whether extrinsic act
evidence should be admitted to prove motive, etc.. under rule, trial judge must first
determine if proffered evidence is relevant
to issue other than accused's character, and,
if so, trial judge must balance probative
value of such evidence against dangers of
undue prejudice aroused by such form of
evidence. Ped.Rules Evid. Rule 404(b), 28
U.S.C.A.

6. Criminal Law *=»371(1)
Where a defendant has deliberately
sought as primary means of defense to depict herself as one whose essential philosophy and habitual conduct in life is completely at odds with possession of state of
mind requisite to guilt of offense charged,
defendant may be considered in effect to
have forfeited any protection afforded by
rule against some types of "other act" evidence. Ped.Rules Evid. Rule 404(b), 28 U.S.
C.A.
7. Criminal Law *»730(1)
In prosecution for income tax evasion,
government counsel's unfortunate reference
to defendant's use of "fraudulent" medicaid
forms was sufficiently corrected by cautionary actions that risk of prejudice was adequately removed. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7201; Fed.
Rules Evid. Rule 404(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
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4. Criminal Law *=> 371(12)

5. Criminal Law <*=>369.I
Prohibition of rule that evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove character of person in order to
show that he acted in conformity therewith
is designed to prevent prosecutorial overreaching by means so obviously effective
that it has been inescapable temptation for
advocates over the years. Fed.Rules Evid.
Rule 404(b), 28 U.S.C.A.

UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON

Before RUSSELL, WIDENER
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.

and

JAMES DICKSON PHILLIPS, Circuit
Judge:
Convicted by a jury of federal income tax
evasion under 26 U.S.C.A. § 7201, Eileen
Eldorado Johnson unsuccessfully moved in
the district court for a new trial, on the
grounds that evidence of her overstated
Medicaid billings was improperly admitted
and that government counsel's reference to
her "fraudulent" Medicaid forms unduly
prejudiced the jury. We affirm, holding
that the extrinsic acts evidence was properly admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) and
that no prejudice resulted from the "fraudulent" reference in view of the trial court's
corrective action.
I
Johnson is a medical doctor, who inherited her practice from her deceased brother.
She filed tax returns for 1972, 1973, and
1974, which understated her income by approximately $120,000.00 and her tax liability by approximately $31,000.00. Her defense at trial was inadvertence: she had
had nothing to do with preparing her tax
returns because she cared nothing for money and chose, instead, to devote her time to
the demanding personal needs of her patients. To support this defense she produced seven local witnesses-three physicians, a
school board member, a public school teacher, a mortician, and a minister-who testified to her truthfulness, honesty, and compassion, and to the busy nature of her practice.

In attempted rebuttal of this portrait of
Johnson as an altruistic healer of the sick,
whose concerns lay elsewhere than attending to her financial interests and resulting
legal responsibilities, the government called
Robert Pemberton, an auditor for the U.S.
Department of Health, Education & Welfare. Pemberton testified at length about
his investigation of Johnson's billings for
Medicaid services for 1976-78. His study
showed that Johnson reported four times as
many services per patient as other Virginia

doctors. Johnson did not object to the general course of Pemberton's testimony. In
fact, the following day Johnson again took
the stand in order to testify that she had
not signed the Medicaid billings upon which
Pemberton had based his investigation.
During cross-examination, government
counsel asked Johnson, "Who would have
received the benefit of all the fraudulent
forms for Medicaid that were filed?" Johnson's counsel objected and moved for a mistrial because use of the term, "fraudulent,"
unduly prejudiced the jury. The trial judge
overruled the motion, directed government
counsel to rephrase the question, and gave
the jury a cautionary instruction.
II
fl] We hold that Pemberton's testimony
was admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b),
which provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acta
is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
[2,3] The first sentence of Rule 404(b)
brings forward the traditional rule that extrinsic acts evidence is inadmissible solely to
prove that defendant is a bad character
and. therefore, likely to have committed the
crime charged. See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93
L.Ed. 168 (1948); United States v. Woods,
484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973); Lovely v.
United States, 169 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948);
Advisory Committee Notes to Fed.R.Evid.
404(b); McCormick, Evidence § 190, at 447
(2d ed. 1972). Extrinsic acts evidence, however, may be admissible for other purposes
including those listed in Rule 404(b). The
Rule's list is merely illustrative, not exclusive. Wright & Graham, Federal Practice
and Procedure: Evidence § 5240, at 469
(1978).
[4] Rule 404(b) of course commits to
trial judge discretion the determination
whether extrinsic act evidence shall be ad-

mitted under its second sentence. In exercising that discretion the judge first must
determine if the proffered evidence is relevant to an issue other than the accused's
character. If so, then the trial judge must
balance the evidence's probative value
against the dangers of undue prejudice
aroused by this form of evidence. This may
co needed I y pose particularly difficult problems. The Advisory Committee Notes to
Rule 404(b) state:
No mechanical solution is offered. The
determination must be made whether the
danger of undue prejudice outweighs the
probative value of the availability of other means of proof and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this
kind under Rule 403 [confusion of issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, waste
of time, and needless presentation of
cumulative evidence].
[5] Within this general guideline for the
exercise of trial court discretion, we think
the evidence here challenged was properly
admitted. The general prohibition contained in the first sentence of Rule 404(b) is
designed to prevent prosecutorial overreaching by a means whose obvious effectiveness has made it an inescapable temptation for advocates over the years. The
second sentence, however, reflects the perception that evidence of "other acts" may
sometimes be critical to proof on a dispositive issue related to a defendant's state of
mind. The ambivalence reflected in the
Rule but serves to emphasize the particular
delicacy of the discretionary rulings its administration may require. There is no gainsaying that the ruling here posed just such
a problem for the trial judge, but we think
he properly resolved it.
[6] Particularly where, as here, a defendant in a criminal case by her own testimony and that of others has deliberately
sought as the primary means of defense to
depict herself as one whose essential philosophy and habitual conduct in life is completely at odds with the possession of a
state of mind requisite to guilt of the offense charged, that defendant may be considered in effect to have forfeited any pro-
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tection that the first sentence of the Rule
might otherwise have provided against the
type of "other act" evidence here challenged. See Waider v. United States, 347
U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 LEd. 503 (1954).
In such circumstances, testimony such as
that of Pemberton may well be the only
effective way to rebut evidence designed
generally to plant in the jury's mind a
reasonable doubt that such a person could
have possessed the culpability of mind requisite to convict of the crime charged. Balancing the probative value of the challenged evidence against its potential for
unfairly prejudicing the defendant, and on
the latter point taking into account that the
defendant deliberately chose to base her
defense upon evidence not otherwise effectively rebuttable, we conclude that the district judge's admission of Pemberton's evidence lay well within the bounds of the
discretion reposed in him.
HI
[7] We think that government counsel'!
unfortunate reference to "fraudulent" Med*
icaid forms was sufficiently corrected by
the trial judge's cautionary actions so that
the risk of prejudice was adequately removed.
Finding no merit in the defendant's other
contentions, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
WIDENER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent and would grant a
new trial.
Assuming that the evidence of other acts
is admissible for one purpose or another,
and I think, after United States v. Woods,
484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), even taking
into consideration the later advent of the
new rules, the admissibility of such evidence is pretty well entrusted in this circuit
to the almost uncontrolled discretion of the
trial judge, Pemberton's most damning testimony is not considered by the majority in
its opinion.

concluded Dr. Johnson had done was proved
by statements other than those made by the
declarant while testifying at a trial or hearing and offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. This is hearsay pure and simple under FRE 801(c) and
inadmissible under FRE 802, for it is not
subject to any exception as to which I am
advised.
An example follows:
"THE COURT:
Q. And then you checked with some of
the patients?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And found out that the services were
not rendered?
A. In talking with the recipients, they
stated that they had not received
certain services which were billed by
Dr. Johnson."
Specific instances of conduct, whether offered to rebut a defense to the merits, as
the majority treats it, or whether offered to
rebut a defense of good character, I think
may no more be proved by hearsay than
any other essential fact in the case.
The testimony I have quoted is only a
part of that introduced; other evidence is
equally as inadmissible. It may only be
considered highly prejudicial, and its admission should warrant a new trial.
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Pemberton testified that Dr. Johnson had
billed for specific services not rendered, and
he ascertained that fact by asking the paGeorgia resident brought action against
tients involved. Thus, the false billing he 1 nnsylvania and New York corporations to

auftssuFj* ns (isss)
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge,
recover damages for personal injuries sustained. The United States District Court and BUTZNER and SPROUSE, Circuit
for the District of South Carolina, Sol Blatt, Judges.
Jr., J., 478 F.Supp. 1137, denied the corporations' motions to dismiss and permission to
HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge:
appeal was granted. The Court of Appeals,
[1] By permission of this court, Proctor
Haynsworth, Chief Judge, held that South
Carolina statute, closing the doors of South & Schwartz, Inc. and SCM Corporation
Carolina's courts for suits involving a for- prosecute this interlocutory § 1292(b) apeign cause of action brought by a foreign peal of the denial of their motions to displaintiff against a foreign corporation, de- miss. Among the grounds asserted for reprived the District Court of jurisdiction versal, they argue that South Carolina's
over the injured Georgia resident's suit, in "door closing" statute, S.C.Code § 15-5the absence of countervailing affirmative 150, deprived the district court of jurisdicfederal considerations.
tion. We agree.
Reversed and remanded.
In 1972, Rollins was injured in an accident involving a machine manufactured by
Proctor & Schwartz. Rollins resides in, was
1. Federal Courts «=»75
South Carolina statute, closing the injured in, and recovered workmen's comdoors of South Carolina's courts for suits pensation in Georgia. The allegedly defecinvolving a foreign cause of action brought tive machine was manufactured in Pennsylby a foreign plaintiff against a foreign cor- vania. Proctor & Schwartz, a Pennsylvania
poration, deprived federal district court of corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary
jurisdiction over injured Georgia workman's of SCM, a New York corporation.
suit against Pennsylvania manufacturer of
Five years after the accident, Rollins sued
a machine which injured him in Georgia, in
the absence of countervailing affirmative the two foreign corporations in the United
federal considerations. S.C.Code 1976, States District Court for the District of c>i
South Carolina. South Carolina's relatively
^
§ 15-5-150.
long six year statute of limitations, rather
2. Federal Courts «=>75
than any nexus with the facts giving rise to
Plaintiffs failure to timely file suit in this cause of action, dictated Rollins' choice
the more logical, convenient forum did not of forum. By 1977 the Georgia limitations
constitute a countervailing consideration fa- period had long since run.
voring exercise of federal jurisdiction in the
Section 15 5-150 opens the South Caroliface of statute closing doors of state's
courts for suits involving a foreign cause of na state courts to two types of suits against
action brought by a foreign plaintiff foreign corporations: (1) by any resident
against a foreign corporation. S.C.Code for any cause of action; and (2) by a nonresident for any cause of action that arose
1976, § 15-5-150.
within South Carolina. By implication, and
of the South Carolina SuJohn P. Linton, Charleston, S. C. (Sinkler, by interpretation
1
Gibbs & Simons, Charleston, S. C, on brief) preme Court, the statute closes the doors
and Samuel P. Pierce, Jr., Atlanta, Ga. of South Carolina's courts for suits, as the
(Warner S. Currie, Swift, Currie, McGhee & present one, involving a foreign cause of
Hiers, Atlanta, Ga., on brief)* for appel- action brought by a foreign plaintiff
against a foreign corporation.
lants.
In Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corporation,
John E. Parker, Ridgeland, S. C. (Peters,
Murdaugh, Parker, Eltzroth & Detrick, 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965), this court held
Ridgeland, S. C, on brief), for appellee. that a South Carolina federal court exercis1. Nix v. Mercury Motors Exp. Inc.. 270 S.C
477. 242 S.E.2d 683 (1979).
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